Starting in 2010, the Obama Administration engaged in an effort to justify drones strikes relying on the concept of 'imminence.' The aim of this article is to understand the reasons behind such insistence and to assess the Administration's efforts at conceptual change. Building on Skinner's and Bentley's work, the article argues that the administration has followed an 'innovating ideologist' strategy. The analysis shows how waves of criticisms exposed the administration to a key contradiction between its rhetoric of change that emphasised international law and the need for aggressive counter-terrorism. Reacting to this criticism, the administration has relied on imminence due to its connection with legitimate uses of force, while working to change the criteria for the concept, causing a shift away from imminent as 'immediate.' Re-assessing Skinner's place in IR, the article identifies conceptual change as a lens to assess foreign policy rhetoric and practice. The analysis emphasises the connection between actors' intentions, beliefs and practices. It highlights the importance of criticism in engendering contradictions, exploring why only some criticisms are confronted. Finally, the article develops an original typology of the limits confronted by the innovating ideologist and methods to assess whether the actor has respected them.
This article can be divided into three main sections. The first section will explore Bentley's and
Skinner's arguments. The second section will look at conventions surrounding imminence, expanding on the different approaches to imminence and international law adopted by the Bush and Obama Administrations. The final section will detail the administration's conceptual change. The conclusion will stress the importance of conceptual change as a lens to explore foreign policy rhetoric and practice.
Skinner, Bentley and International Relations

Skinner's third way: actors, beliefs and intentions
As Bentley writes, Skinner's approach is based on the study of speech-acts and on the assumption that we can do things with words. 17 Skinner focuses on the illocutionary effects of an utterance (defined as its intended significance) as they permit a 'grasp of the point of the 27 Looking at Skinner's account, this interpretation can be corroborated through a three-step process. First, we should assume that whatever an actor was doing, it was doing it intentionally. 28 Second, since intentions depend on beliefs we should make sure that the actor possesses beliefs that are compatible with the intentions we are assigning him/her. The attribution of intentions can also be strengthened by the discovery that the actor had a motive.
29
Third, one should note that principles are professed with certain consistency; they aim at locating an utterance in a precise normative and linguistic context. 30 We should then corroborate the interpretation by examining the coherence of an actor's beliefs. 31 We should assess whether an actor's current utterances conform to same traditions and approaches, whether they are compatible with other utterances, and whether an actor's utterances have followed similar traditions and approaches in the past. We should look at his/her track record. To be sure, actors feel the need to answer only some criticisms, hence, only some lines of criticism lead to conceptual change. Conceptual change represents a problem-solving strategy.
Context
Engaging in conceptual change, the actor clearly has multiple aims. S/he is trying to achieve political and strategic objectives, s/he is trying to quiet opposition, that is, to convince an audience of the appropriateness of his/her behaviour; finally, conceptual change also represents an effort to ease the discomfort created by contradiction. 51 In the latter sense, conceptual change acts as a strategy to reduce what the political-psychology literature calls dissonance. As Robert Jervis reported, purely negative strategies like the avoidance of dissonant information are rare.
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An actor tends to adopt positive strategies to reduce the discomfort created by dissonant information. 53 These strategies, Ole Holsti detailed, include discrediting the source, reinterpreting the information in a positive light, but also modifying or changing existing attitudes and ideas. It is in this last option that conceptual change plays a role. Holsti has provided suggestions as to which contradictions will be ignored, which will be answered, and how. One should look at the contents and source of the dissonant information, at situational factors, and at personality factors. 54 Once an ideologist has settled on an available concept, s/he confronts additional limits concerning the plausibility of the conceptual manipulation. As Bentley argues, conceptual manipulation represents a balance between innovation and convention: 'conceptual flexibility has to "answer" and justify itself, to convention.' 66 Skinner acknowledged that the 'dominance' of practices and conventions depends to a large extent on the 'power of our normative language to hold them in place.' 67 However, he also emphasised the difficulties an ideologist confronts in convincing the audience of the plausibility of his/her claims. 68 Manipulating existing terms constitutes a 'linguistic sleight-of-hand.' 69 The ideologist runs a double risk of failing. If in the process of innovation he drops too many of the criteria that define the concept, s/he runs the risk of failing by making his/her 'sleight' too visible. If s/he doesn't drop enough criteria, s/he runs the risk that the concept won't cover his/her actions after all. 70 The tailoring of a concept, however, like the availability of terms, is not totally under the control of the actor. 71 Ideologists can rely 'on some freedom for manoeuvre…in the criteria for the application of the relevant The strategy was crystallised in the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS). 120 Having called for a strategy of pre-emption, the NSS made a specific claim as to the need to 'adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries.' 121 The NSS itself blurred the distinction between pre-emption and prevention. At one point the document stated that the US needed to 'prevent' threats by acting 'preemptively.' 122 The NSS did not explicitly adapt the concept of imminence, nor did the Bush Administration. 123 This, however, does not mean that debates surrounding pre-emption did not occur during the Bush years. The NSS engendered a heated debate regarding pre-emption and the use of force. 124 The point being made here is that imminence was not redefined; it was side-lined.
At the international level, views of the Bush Doctrine often coincided with views on the Iraq
War. Even among supporters of the war, however, several governments showed uneasiness regarding Bush Administration's unwillingness to define imminence. The UK and Australia, for example, argued that imminence played a prominent role in decision surrounding self-defence and it should have been defined. 125 Among scholars and commentators, the vagueness surrounding imminence received criticism both at the time and later. As critics noted, the identification of criteria for imminence would have represented a key step. 126 The refusal to
provide details of what would comprise 'justifiable preemptive action' meant, according to Patricia Dunmire, that pre-emption and imminence were 'gradually detached from their justificatory context of international law.' 127 In particular, the NSS seemed to adopt a double standard using 'imminent' when referring to the framework of international law, but using 'sufficient' -a more ambiguous term -when discussing the US's justification for action. 128 Public statements and internal deliberations confirmed that the administration had no intention of redefining imminence. 129 Among the president's key beliefs, the need to strengthen counter-terrorism was also prominent.
Since the campaign, the Obama team had criticized the Bush Administration for many of its foreign policy choices and for its aggressiveness in pursuing them. On counter-terrorism, however, Obama accused his predecessor of having been soft on al-Qaeda. 155 In this sense, the administration gave early signals of its intention to strengthen counter-terrorism while 149 These include the refusal to work with Congress to get new military detention authorities for fear that Congress might give it more power, or the acceptance, in spite of plausible Article 2 argument to the contrary, of Congress 'unprecedented restrictions' on the president's power to transfer enemy prisoners. See Goldsmith, (2012), p. 42. 150 Goldsmith (2012) In line with Skinner's approach this overview does not hope to get into the policymakers' heads.
The analysis has contrasted the beliefs held by Bush Administration officials and those held by members of the Obama Administration. This has provided a necessary background to corroborate this article's interpretation through an emphasis on the coherence of actors'
professed principles as well as on the compatibility between beliefs of the actors and intentions we are assigning them.
Conceptual change: shifts, criticism, and contradictions
The language adopted by the administration and the emphasis on international law aimed at painting Obama's policies with a new 'normative colour. ' 159 In Farr's terms, this represented the administration's contradiction. It concerned inconsistencies between beliefs of its key members and its rhetoric of change and international law, on one side, and its practice on the other.
In the very early days, Obama clearly discussed the importance of language and the perils of using 'war on terror' to describe US counter-terrorism. 160 The administration substituted 'Global War on Terror' with 'overseas contingency operations.' 161 As Adam Hodges has noted, instead of a universal 'war on terror,' the administration often talked about two wars (Afghanistan and Iraq). 162 Finally, the administration also made an effort to better specify the enemies it was fighting; no longer a global war against a concept, but a struggle against specific groups in specific places. 163 As several scholars have noted, however, these early shifts did not represent a radical change. 164 In spite of recognising the need to abandon the language of the 'war on terror,' the administration adopted many of the narratives (including the 'war' narrative)
established by its predecessor. drones and the 'PlayStation mentality' they created. 175 As Obama clarified, criticisms from these sources helped him and the administration realise that the drone program was unregulated and this contradicted some of the administration's key beliefs (as well as rhetoric). 176 In Holsti's and Farr's words, the source and contents of these criticisms made the contradiction between rhetoric and practice hard to ignore. With the number of drone strikes rising, with criticisms coming from several quarters, and with the administration working on a particularly an individual presents an "imminent threat" incorporates considerations of the relevant window of opportunity to act, the possible harm that missing the window Calling a ball "in" when it just touches the outside of the baseline is skirting the edge of the permissible…Calling a ball "in" when you know it landed outside the baseline is cheating, but it is still "playing tennis"…Pausing to beat up your opponent when he complains that you are cheating is no longer tennis, however; the resort to force destroys the game entirely.'
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The Bush Administration's arguments regarding waterboarding and torture represented, in
Brooks's, view the destruction of the game. It could be argued that the White Paper interpretation of imminence constituted cheating. In its more recent interpretation, with a renewed emphasis on the temporal element, the administration might be 'skirting the edge of the permissible.' However, it seems that the administration is still 'playing tennis.' The increased international acceptance discussed above seems to support recognition of the plausibility of the Administration's manipulation.
On credibility, a comprehensive assessment of the administration's practices will, perhaps, be possible in the future. Only in the longer-term discrepancies between legitimation and action fully emerge. The Reagan Administration, for example, justified Operation Urgent Fury (the invasion of Grenada) relying on the need to protect US students on the island. We now know, 216 Furthermore, as Chayes argued, the fact that we cannot find a direct causation between principles and policies 'is no more fatal to the operation of legal factors than of any other kind of indeterminate data or analysis bearing on decision.' 217 In the context of the Obama Administration's drone strikes, then, it might be easy to find cases in which the administration exceeded its professed principles. What this exercise obscures, however, is 'the scores of times' in which principles pre-empted operations and policies that never made it onto the agenda. 218 Looking at the Obama Administration's credibility, it might not be right to suggest that legitimating principles directly caused a restraint in policies, but rushing to the opposite view -that they had no role -is unconvincing.
Conclusion
In a 2016 lecture, Harold Koh argued that the US government should have abandoned ideas regarding war as a 'legal black hole.' It should have engaged instead in a 'translation exercise from previously agreed international rules,' adapting these rules while maintaining their spirit and while acting within the framework of the law. 219 This article has provided a Skinnerian interpretation of this translation effort by exploring the Obama Administration's legitimation of targeted killings. The analysis has placed conceptual change at the centre of foreign policy legitimation. 
